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Abstract 
Jurors are vulnerable to an array of cognitive biases that can result in an over-belief 
of confession evidence. A combination of automatic acceptance, self-serving 
expectations and the Fundamental Attribution Error may result in an initial 
hypothesis of guilt, with confirmation bias reinforcing this with the evaluation of 
subsequent evidence. There were two main aims of this research. First, to examine 
the extent to which mock jurors are sensitive to inconsistencies in confessions. 
Second, to test the capacity of a hypothesis disconfirmation intervention to enhance 
sensitivity to inconsistencies by encouraging mock jurors to more critically evaluate 
confession evidence. The online study followed a 2 (confession strength: weak, 
strong) x 3 (hypothesis disconfirmation: pre-confession, post-confession, control) 
between-subjects design. Participants read a police report detailing the facts of a 
crime and a signed confession statement (either weak and inconsistent with the 
police report, or strong and consistent). Participants in hypothesis disconfirmation 
conditions listed up to 10 reasons why someone might falsely confess. Confession 
strength had a significant main effect on perceived consistency of confession 
evidence (p<.001), verdict (p=.004) and verdict preference (p=.006), while 
perceived likelihood of guilt bordered on significance (p=.053). Neither the 
hypothesis disconfirmation nor the strength x hypothesis disconfirmation interaction 
had any significant main effects on any of the dependent variables (p>.05). It seems, 
mock jurors were sufficiently sensitive to inconsistencies in the confession evidence, 
leaving little room for the hypothesis disconfirmation to have any effect. Before 
hypothesis disconfirmation is labelled as an ineffective technique for encouraging 
jurors to more critically evaluate confession evidence, its efficacy should first be 
tested in cases where jurors’ over-belief in confession evidence is more pronounced. 
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A confession is considered the gold standard of evidence in a criminal 
investigation (Kassin, 2012).  Once a confession is elicited, the investigation is often 
deemed closed, with investigators ceasing to search for incriminating (or 
exculpatory) evidence (Drizin & Leo, 2004). A confession, whether true or false, 
increases the likelihood of conviction, and thus has a major impact on the life of the 
suspect and the provision of justice. False confessions are therefore problematic. 
First, they increase the risk of an innocent defendant being imprisoned. In over 25% 
of DNA exonerations, suspects have been convicted on the basis of a false 
confession (Innocence Project, 2016a). Furthermore, false confessions were 
implicated in 12 of 17 DNA exonerations for inmates on death row (Innocence 
Project, 2009). For example, Earl Washington Jr., was wrongfully convicted for rape 
and murder in 1984 after being coerced to confess by investigators. He spent more 
than 16 years in prison before his exoneration, escaping his execution by only 9 days 
(Innocence Project, 2016b). Second, and perhaps less obviously, by increasing the 
risk of wrongful prosecution and conviction, false confessions also increase the risk 
that dangerous perpetrators remain undetected. Although various safeguards have 
been implemented to reduce (a) the risk of false confessions, and (b) the likelihood 
that a false confession will lead to wrongful prosecution, false confessions remain an 
issue (Kassin & Sukel, 1997). One major problem is that jurors are not sufficiently 
critical of confession evidence. False confessions invoke strong inferences of guilt, 
prompting a chain of cognitive biases that strengthen the attribution of guilt, despite 
the suspect’s innocence (Kassin, 2012). Our focus was to test a simple hypothesis 
disconfirmation intervention intended to reframe jurors’ mindset, and attenuate the 
judgemental biases that can lead from a confession to an automatic assumption of 
guilt when jurors fail to appropriately critique confession evidence.  
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There are a number of questions that need to be addressed before juror 
perceptions of false confessions can be explored. Why do people confess to crimes 
that they did not commit? Are some types of false confessions more obvious than 
others? Why are false confessions so believable? And how do false confessions lead 
to wrongful convictions? 
Why People Falsely Confess.  
A number of factors increase the likelihood of a suspect falsely confessing, 
including: duress, coercion, intoxication, diminished capacity, cognitive impairment, 
ignorance of the law, the threat or infliction of harm, promises of leniency, 
misunderstandings and language barriers (Innocence Project, 2016a; Kassin & 
Sukel, 1997). Most false confessions are the product of prolonged interrogative 
processes in which the suspect is subjected to long periods of isolation and fatigue, 
which increases vulnerability to manipulation and impedes complex decision-
making abilities (Blagrove, 1996; Harrison & Horne, 2000; Kassin & Sukel, 1997).  
Investigators sometimes present false evidence in attempt to elicit a false confession, 
directly deceiving and manipulating the suspect. Suspects are more likely to 
surrender when they believe that the police have strong evidence against them, and 
false evidence increases the risk that the suspect will internalise blame for the crime 
in question (Kassin, 2005). One thing many false confession cases share is that, at 
the time, the suspect believed that complying with interrogators by claiming 
responsibility for the crime in question was more beneficial than maintaining their 
innocence (Innocence Project, 2016a). False confessors are often over-confident in 
the transparency of their innocence, believing that truth will prevail and DNA 
evidence will prove their innocence (Kassin & Sukel, 1997). However, anecdotal 
evidence and case studies demonstrate that this is not true. Even when suspects 
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withdraw their confessions, it is still compelling evidence in court. Further, although 
juveniles and individuals with mental illnesses are most vulnerable to falsely 
confessing, cognitively-normal adults account for the majority of false confessors 
(Drizin & Leo, 2004). Thus, the potential for false confessions to occur, and to 
facilitate miscarriages of justice, is not just limited to any particular demographic. 
Types of False Confessions.  
Kassin and Wrightsman (1985) identified three types of false confessions: 
voluntary, coerced-compliant and coerced-internalised. Voluntary false confessions 
are self-incriminating statements offered in the absence of external pressure. For 
example, a suspect may voluntarily confess in order to protect the real perpetrator or 
gain notoriety. Voluntary confessions are more accurately detected than other types 
of false confession, as they are less detailed than police-induced false confessions 
(Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985). Coerced-compliant confessions are acts of 
compliance by suspects who know that they are truly innocent. The suspect usually 
confesses in order to escape an aversive interrogation, avoid an explicit or implied 
threat of harm or to gain a promised or implied reward (Kassin, 2005).  For example, 
in the Central Park Jogger case, each of the five teenage boys confessed with the 
expectation that they would be going home afterwards. Finally, coerced-internalised 
false confessions occur when the suspect comes to believe that he or she truly 
committed the crime. This is often a product of false evidence ploys, fatigue, 
confusion, and the formation of false memories in response to highly suggestive 
procedures (Kassin, 2005). Coerced-internalised false confessions seem the most 
unlikely and are thus the hardest for jurors to comprehend. For example, Paul 
Ingram was charged with rape and multiple satanic cult crimes, including the murder 
of new born babies. Interrogations took over six months, and during this time 
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Ingram was hypnotised, exposed to graphic crime details not in the public domain, 
informed by a police psychologist that sexual offenders often repress the memories 
of their crimes, and the minister of his church urged him to confess. Ingram 
eventually ‘recalled’ his crimes, describing them in rich detail. He pleaded not guilty 
but was sentenced to prison. However, there was no corroborating evidence and an 
expert reviewing the case concluded that Ingram had been brainwashed. To prove 
his point, he accused Ingram of an imaginary crime. While Ingram initially denied 
his involvement, he later confessed and even embellished the story (Kassin & 
Kiechel, 1996). 
Believability of False Confessions.  
Police-induced false confessions (i.e., coerced-compliant and coerced-
internalised confessions) are particularly believable. Innocent suspects are often fed 
details of the crime through leading questions and overheard conversations, allowing 
for richly-detailed confessions. False confessions often contain details about the 
crime that are out of the public domain. To an unsuspecting observer, the confession 
statement appears voluntary, accurate and the product of personal experience, giving 
the observer no reason to doubt its veracity (Kassin, 2005).  While confessions 
produced in response to the threat of violence are often acknowledged as being 
involuntary, those made in response to promises of leniency are perceived as more 
voluntary and thus more indicative of guilt (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). 
How False Confessions Lead to Wrongful Convictions.  
False confessions facilitate wrongful conviction in three ways. First, and 
most obviously, false confessions provide self-incriminating evidence, which 
contradicts the idea that the suspect is innocent. Second, false confessions can taint 
other evidence in the trial, and even prevent exculpatory evidence from being 
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presented (Kassin, 2012). Third, people are insufficiently critical of confession 
evidence (Palmer, Burton, Barnett & Brewer, 2014). While the first point is quite 
self-explanatory, the second two points require elaboration. 
The Effects of Confessions on Other Evidence  
 False confessions may suppress or alter perceptions of exculpatory evidence, 
preventing it from being properly considered (or even presented) in the courtroom. 
Hasel and Kassin (2009) looked at the effects of confession evidence on eyewitness 
identifications. Participants viewed a simulated crime video followed by a lineup. 
After making a decision (either identifying the perpetrator or rejecting the lineup), 
participants were told that one of the non-identified lineup members had confessed. 
Of those who originally rejected the lineup, 50% now identified the “confessor”. Of 
those who originally made an identification, 61% changed their selection to identify 
the confessor. Similarly, polygraph (Elaad. Ginton & Ben-Shakhar, 1994), 
fingerprint (Dror & Charlton, 2006) and handwriting experts (Kukucka & Kassin, 
2013) have been shown to change their professional opinions when informed that a 
suspect had confessed. Seemingly, any evidence involving an element of subjective 
human judgement might be tainted by the knowledge of a confession (Kukucka & 
Kassin, 2013). Further, in terms of suppressing exculpatory evidence, Hasel and 
Kassin (2009) speculate that upon hearing a confession, individuals providing alibis 
may doubt their recollection of events and withdraw their statements. Thus, the 
damaging ramifications of false confessions extend beyond the incriminating 
evidence of the confession itself. Preventing false confessions therefore serves two 
functions. First, it removes a falsely incriminating piece of evidence from the 
equation. Second, it improves the reliability of evaluations of other evidence.  
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Public Perceptions of False Confessions 
 Large discrepancies exist between public perceptions of false confessions and 
their occurrence in reality. Costanzo and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that 
members of the general public believed that there was a 52% chance that a jury 
would convict a suspect who falsely confessed to a murder in the absence of any 
other incriminating evidence. In contrast, Drizin and Leo’s (2004) comprehensive 
analysis of 125 real exoneration cases involving false confessions found that when 
suspects confessed to a crime and then pleaded ‘not guilty’, the conviction rate was 
81%, even when there was no corroborating evidence and even in the presence of 
evidence that clearly contradicted the confession. Thus, potential jurors (i.e., 
members of the general public) significantly underestimate the potency of 
confession evidence.  
Impact of False Confessions on Juror Verdicts 
 False confessions are particularly compelling, in part because individuals are 
poor at identifying them. People are not adept at detecting deception. Neither lay 
people nor trained professionals are able to distinguish truth from lies at high levels 
of accuracy (Appleby, Hasel & Kassin, 2013). While false confessions are more the 
product of compliance than deception, people are similarly inept at distinguishing 
between true and false confessions. Kassin, Meissner and Norwick (2005) found that 
the ability of jury-eligible samples and police investigators to accurately 
discriminate between true and false videotaped confessions of inmates was little 
better than chance, (ranging from 42% to 64%).  
Confession evidence has a substantial impact on jury verdicts. Although it 
may seem common sense that people would believe science over self-report, 
confession evidence trumps eyewitness and character testimony, alibis, and even 
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DNA evidence (Kassin & Neumann, 1997). Confessions significantly increase 
conviction rates, even when jurors perceive the confession to be involuntary, and 
even in the absence of corroborating evidence (Kassin & Sukel, 1997). Compared to 
no-confession control groups, mock-jurors show an increased bias towards guilty 
verdicts when presented with inadmissible confession evidence, despite claiming 
that the confession has no influence on their decision-making (Kassin & Sukel, 
1997). When people do recognise the use of coercive tactics in the extraction of a 
confession, they often do not associate this situational pressure with an 
accompanying increase in the risk of falsely confessing (Henkel, Coffman & Dailey, 
2008; Leo & Liu, 2009). As the prosecution presents their evidence before the 
defence, and confessions can taint perceptions of other evidence, dubious confession 
evidence can influence perceptions of all subsequent evidence, before the defence 
has the opportunity to provide context as to how the confession was elicited. As 
discussed later, this order of presentation has the potential to promote confirmation 
bias in the processing of confession evidence.  
Minimising Wrongful Convictions due to False Confessions 
 Safeguards have been implemented to reduce the rate of wrongful convictions 
resulting from false confessions, with specific measures applied to protect 
vulnerable populations. For example, minors must be accompanied by a professional 
advocate, preferably an attorney, throughout all investigative procedures (Kassin, 
2012). Investigation and interrogation procedures have also been reformed, with 
deceptive tactics like using false evidence to extract a confession being prohibited in 
some (though not all) jurisdictions, and the implementation of corroboration 
requirements providing an incentive for investigators to continue seeking physical 
evidence after producing a confession (Kassin, 2012).  
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Most jurisdictions require interrogation processes to be filmed, with 
recordings made available to judges and juries (Kassin, 2008). This encourages 
investigators to refrain from employing coercive tactics (and defence lawyers to 
withhold from unduly claiming coercion). Filmed interrogation procedures provide 
context as to how a confession was elicited, potentially highlighting situational 
forces at play (Appleby et al., 2013; Kassin & Sukel, 1997).  However, the camera 
perspective bias undermines the utility of this information source. People are more 
sensitive to situational factors used to elicit a false confession when both the suspect 
and the interrogators are visible on the camera, as opposed to when the focus is 
wholly on the suspect, and illusory correlation prompts jurors to attribute the cause 
of the confession to the most salient stimulus (i.e., the suspect; Lassiter & Geers, 
2004). Permitting jurors to access video footage of entire interrogation processes lets 
them observe the conditions under which the confession was elicited and the source 
of the details it contains, allowing them to make more informed judgements of 
voluntariness and guilt (Lassiter, Geers, Handley, Weiland & Munhall, 2002). 
However, video-recordings are not enough to prevent false confessions. 
 If a confession is disputed, a specific process must be adhered to. First, a judge 
determines the admissibility of the confession in a preliminary hearing. Confessions 
may be excluded if they were obtained in response to physical violence, the threat of 
punishment or harm, promises of leniency, or without notifying of the suspect of 
their Miranda rights (Kassin & Sukel, 1997). Confessions deemed admissible will 
either go to court without informing the jury of the dispute, or the jury will be asked 
to make independent judgements regarding the voluntariness of the confession. If 
perceived as involuntary the jury should disregard it. The court, therefore, places 
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faith in the jury’s ability to distinguish true from false confessions, and their ability 
and willingness to disregard false confessions. 
 While these measures are somewhat successful in reducing wrongful 
convictions based on false confessions, none of them directly target jurors’ ability to 
critique confession evidence. Expert testimony attempts to do this through 
introducing a qualified psychologist to increase jurors’ awareness of the individual 
characteristics, interrogation tactics and situational pressures that make falsely 
confessing more likely (Costanzo & Leo, 2007). Jurors can then decide how much 
weight should be assigned to the confession in question (Costanzo, Shaked-Schroer 
& Vinson, 2010). However, there are also concerns that expert testimony causes 
jurors to overestimate the likelihood of a false confession (Costanzo et al., 2010). 
Though, some studies suggest this likelihood is already overestimated, with potential 
jurors estimating that 19-24% of all confessions are false (Costanzo et al., 2010). By 
educating jurors on the psychology of false confessions, expert testimony may 
instead work to create a more realistic perception of false confession evidence 
(Costanzo et al., 2010). However, a key issue for expert testimony is the timing of its 
presentation (Costanzo et al., 2010). The prosecution presents their evidence before 
the defence, meaning that jurors have already processed and evaluated the 
confession evidence before being presented with the expert testimony. Moreover, 
jurors seem unlikely to re-evaluate the confession evidence in light of advice given 
by the expert witness (Ross & Anderson, 1982). Therefore, it could potentially be 
more beneficial for a method of intervention to be provided earlier in the evaluation 
process. A key issue with the aforementioned safeguards is that they fail to address 
the cognitive biases that influence jurors’ initial evaluations of confession evidence, 
and therefore influence perceptions of subsequent evidence.  
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Juror Decision Making 
The jury – who evaluate the credibility of confession evidence - is the last 
barrier between an innocent confessor and imprisonment (Costanzo et al., 2010). 
When jurors enter a courtroom, they bring with them pre-existing beliefs, ideas, 
expectations and cognitive biases. These can shape interpretations of evidence and 
influence verdict decisions.  
Jurors are advised to be open-minded during the presentation of evidence, 
and to refrain from forming an opinion regarding guilt until all evidence has been 
presented (Nickerson, 1998).  However, research in human cognition suggests that 
jurors will probably form an opinion early in the trial (Nickerson, 1998). Once that 
initial opinion is formed, an array of basic cognitive biases may contribute to 
misinterpretation of evidence and, specifically, an over-belief of confession 
evidence. One common misinterpretation involves evaluations of confession 
strength. The following sections will explore this misinterpretation and the cognitive 
biases involved in evaluating confession strength in greater depth. 
Evaluating confession strength. Jurors may lack sensitivity to factors 
relevant to assessing confession strength (Palmer et al., 2014). If an intervention is to 
improve juror decisions making, it must increase jurors’ sensitivity to the strength of 
the evidence, not just increase overall scepticism. Sensitivity in this context may 
refer to knowledge of factors influencing the elicitation of a confession, and the use 
of that knowledge to evaluate confession evidence (Penrod & Cutler, 1989). 
Scepticism may cause jurors to give insufficient and inappropriate weight to actual 
confession evidence (Penrod & Cutler, 1989).   
Malloy and Lamb (2010) speculated that although mock-jurors question the 
credibility of inconsistent eyewitness testimony and alibi statements (see Brewer & 
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Burke, 2002), they are less sceptical of inconsistent confession evidence. Numerous 
studies have provided empirical evidence consistent with this idea (see Najdowski, 
Bottoms & Vargas, 2009; Redlich, Ghetti & Quas, 2008). Malloy and Lamb (2010) 
suggested that inconsistencies in other types of evidence may lead jurors to question 
the motives of witnesses or the prosecution, such as framing the suspect. In contrast, 
it is harder for jurors to generate plausible alternative motivations for a confession. 
Thus, jurors fail to question the credibility of inconsistent confession evidence 
(Henkel et al., 2008). Palmer and colleagues (2014) tested this idea, demonstrating 
that mock-jurors do in fact question the credibility of inconsistent confession 
evidence, but only to the extent that they are aware of inconsistencies. The inability 
to identify inconsistencies could be due to an array of cognitive biases that are 
triggered during the evaluation of confession evidence, such as automatic 
acceptance, truth bias, self-serving expectations, the fundamental attribution error 
and confirmation bias (Kassin, 2012).  
Acceptance and truth bias. Spinoza (1677/1982) proposed that all 
assertions are automatically accepted as truth through the process of comprehension. 
Once accepted, individuals engage in a more effortful evaluation process. Belief in 
the truth of the assertion is then updated if evaluation finds it to be untrue (Spinoza, 
1677/1982). Thus, the tendency to believe a statement precedes the opportunity to 
critically evaluate it. When individuals lack time, energy and/or conclusive 
evidence, they may fail to un-accept the ideas that they had involuntarily accepted 
previously (Gilbert, 1991). Only then can they go about the process of critically 
evaluating it. According to this view, upon hearing a confession, jurors will 
automatically accept it as true.  In contrast, Descartes (1644/1984) suggested that the 
comprehension of an idea is initially met with a period of uncertainty and indecision 
13 
 
while the idea is evaluated. A combination of knowledge, past experiences and 
expectations bias the initial uncertainty towards believing or disbelieving a 
statement, depending on the context (Street & Richardson, 2015). As the “myth of 
physical interrogation” (Leo, 2008) suggests, it is popular belief that a person of 
sound mind will not confess to a crime they did not commit unless tortured. This is 
likely to bias jurors towards trusting confession evidence. While there might not be 
an automatic acceptance of truth, under some circumstances truth may be the 
favoured alternative when evaluating a statement (Street & Richardson, 2015). For 
example, a defendant’s denial of being in a certain area at the time of a crime might 
not be met with an automatic acceptance, but their confession seems to be.  
An early bias towards truth is adaptive in many environments. Most people 
tell the truth most of the time. Thus, a truth bias permits accurate judgements most 
of the time (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer & Epstein, 1996; Serota, Levine & 
Boster, 2010). Truth bias may be the default method of acceptance when an 
individual is uncertain, or if there is no motivation to engage in more effortful 
evaluations of the information received (Street & Richardson, 2015). This truth bias 
might also contribute to poor performance in detecting deception (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006) and discriminating between true and false confessions (Kassin et al., 2005).  
Regardless of whether assertions are automatically accepted as truth or 
heavily influenced by knowledge, past experience and expectations, these 
approaches all suggest that jurors will be likely to believe confession evidence as 
being truthful. 
The acceptance of confession evidence is also influenced by the expectation 
that other people will engage in self-serving behaviour (Kassin, 2005). Any 
statement that contradicts self-interest is particularly believable. Thus, confession 
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evidence seems particularly diagnostic of guilt, especially considering the strong 
inhibiting effects of the consequences of confessing (Appleby et al., 2013; Palmer et 
al., 2014).   
The Fundamental Attribution Error. Attribution theory provides a 
framework for understanding interpretations and inferences drawn from observing 
others’ behaviour (Kelley, 1973; Tetlock, 1985). The Fundamental Attribution Error 
(FAE) is the pervasive phenomena through which people attribute others’ behaviour 
to dispositional (i.e., individual) characteristics while underestimating the influence 
of situational determinants of behaviour (Ross & Anderson, 1982). For example, 
upon seeing a car speeding down the highway, one might assume that the driver is 
an irresponsible idiot, when in fact the driver could be rushing his pregnant wife to 
hospital. Evaluating behaviour at face value, without consideration of situational 
influences, promotes hasty conclusions and erroneous attributions (Kassin, 2005; 
Ross & Anderson, 1982). Jurors are not immune to this tendency and evaluations of 
confession evidence can be influenced by FAE, especially given the limited 
knowledge of the context in which the confession was elicited.  
 FAE was prominent in Bierbauer’s (1979) study into perceptions of behaviour 
in Milgram’s (1963) classic obedience study. Beirbauer found that his participants 
grossly underestimated the degree to which Milgram’s subjects would yield to the 
situational forces that compelled obedience in Milgram’s paradigm. Instead, 
participants attributed the behaviour of Milgram’s subjects to dispositional factors, 
such as being morally inept. They also assumed that they themselves would never 
bow to the pressure of situational forces, and therefore failed to understand why 
Milgram’s subjects did. Similarly, jurors perceive that they would never confess to a 
crime that they did not commit, despite situational forces and constraints, and thus 
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struggle to comprehend why others would. This idea is supported by Costanzo and 
colleagues’ (2010) survey, showing that 91.3% of participants were adamant that 
they would not falsely confess when pressured by police.   
 One factor driving the FAE is a heavy reliance on heuristics and schemas in 
social situations (Kelley, 1973). Schemas provide frameworks for efficiently 
analysing information about an action in order to arrive at a plausible attribution. 
Causal schemas are employed when inferring causes of behaviour based on limited 
information: as is typically the case when a juror observes a single instance of 
alleged behaviour by a defendant within the context of a trial (Kelley, 1973). 
Without multiple behavioural observations, jurors are unable to compare actions to 
assess whether the behaviour is uncharacteristic of the defendant. Consequently, 
they rely on schemas based on past experiences, which generally suggest that 
confessions are indicative of guilt.  
The availability heuristic is another potential mechanism underlying FAE. 
The availability heuristic occurs when individuals rely on readily available 
information instead of examining alternatives (Kelley, 1973). To most people, the 
association between confessing to a crime and being guilty is likely to be more 
salient than the association between confessing and any other motivation. 
Furthermore, when observing behaviour, the individual is more salient than the 
environmental forces influencing the behaviour (Kelley, 1973). As a result, it is 
easier to attribute the actor’s behaviour to disposition rather than environmental 
factors. Thus, lack of information regarding environmental forces makes it much 
easier for jurors to attribute the production of a confession to the defendant’s guilt, 
without regard for situational influences. Kelley’s (1973) augmentation principle 
also suggests that individuals are more likely to attribute behaviour to the actor (cf. 
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situational factors) when an action has obvious constraints, costs, sacrifices or risks 
involved. Falsely confessing to a crime has obvious consequences, making it harder 
to generate plausible alternative motivations. Regardless of the specific mechanism 
involved, FAE is likely to result in jurors attributing the confession to the 
defendant’s guilt.       
Confirmation bias. Once an initial hypothesis has been established, it has 
the potential to influence judgements of all subsequent and related information 
(Nickerson, 1998). Confirmation bias occurs when an initial belief is enhanced 
through the biased search for, recollection, assimilation, and evaluation of 
information (Ross, 1977; Ross & Anderson, 1982). Individuals give more weight to 
arguments supporting initial beliefs while neglecting to gather or discounting 
contradictory information (Nickerson, 1998). This bias accounts for the endurance of 
beliefs in the face of substantial contradictory evidence (Ross & Anderson, 1982). 
 Information presented early in evaluation processes is given more weight than 
information shown later and helps to shape initial opinions, which in turn, colour 
judgements of subsequent evidence (Jones & Goethals, 1972; Nickerson, 1998; 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Webster, 1964). In the courtroom, this is reflected in the 
tendency of jurors to favour a certain verdict quite early in the trial (Devine & 
Ostrom, 1985). The biased search for information means that initial beliefs are 
highly persistent and resistive to change (Nickerson, 1998). Pennington and Hastie 
(1993) support this idea, showing increased mock-juror recall for statements that 
supported (cf. contradicted) their verdict. This partially explains why jurors retain 
initial impressions of guilt in final verdicts, despite the presentation of strong 
exculpatory evidence (Lawson, 1968; Nickerson, 1998; Ross, 1977). Furthermore, 
mock-jurors who selectively use evidence to support one argument over another are 
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more confident in their verdicts than mock-jurors who evaluate evidence for both 
arguments simultaneously (Nickerson, 1998). 
 Doherty and Mynatt (1986) suggested that human cognition is restricted to 
only considering one concept at a time. Consequently, once a hypothesis is formed 
individuals tend to fixate on it. Alternatively, people may simply fail to generate 
alternate hypotheses. Inadequate effort may undermine an extensive search for 
alternate explanations (Baron, 1985; Kanouse, 1972; Nickerson, 1998). Although, 
confirmation bias is reduced when participants are overtly asked to consider 
alternative options, participants tend not to generate these alternatives without 
explicit instruction (Nickerson, 1998). 
This confirmation bias means that initial assumptions of guilt (prompted by 
the array of cognitive processes previously discussed) is often retained. Bacon 
(1620/1939) proposed that “the first conclusion colours and brings to conformity 
with itself all that comes with it” (p. 36). Individuals tend not to consistently update 
and re-evaluate their beliefs in light of new information (Ross & Anderson, 1982). 
Even if a juror’s initial hypothesis of guilt is undermined, they are unlikely to revisit 
and re-assess all of the information that was evaluated under that initial belief.  
Hypothesis Disconfirmation 
 Most individuals consider a situation only to the extent necessary to make 
superficial meaning of it (Perkins, Allen & Hafner, 1983). Once meaning is achieved 
there is no reason to continue searching for an explanation. Continuing to search for 
alternatives might reveal contradictory evidence, undermining the understanding 
gained from the initial explanation. The desire to avoid cognitive dissonance 
reinforces the tendency for early closure. Individuals, therefore, tend adopt an 
explanation before extensively searching for alternatives (Kruglanski, 1980; Perkins 
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et al., 1983). While most beliefs are remarkably resilient, logical and empirical 
challenges to existing hypotheses can change beliefs (Ross & Anderson, 1982). 
Hypothesis disconfirmation is a technique that forces individuals to generate 
explanations as to why an initial hypothesis might be incorrect (Brewer, Keast & 
Rishworth, 2002; Koriat, Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 1980).  Hypothesis 
disconfirmation techniques help individuals overcome the tendency to give 
insufficient consideration to ideas that differ from their initial hypothesis (Brewer et 
al., 2002).  Hypothesis disconfirmation mitigates confirmation bias and reduces the 
over-confidence in judgements that comes from failing to adequately consider 
alternatives (Nickerson, 1998). The efficacy of hypothesis disconfirmation has been 
demonstrated in task domains such as general knowledge, predicting personal 
outcomes, or other future events (Griffin, Dunning & Ross, 1990; Hoch, 1985; 
Koriat et al., 1980). 
 Based on the knowledge that only one hypothesis tends to be considered at a 
time and that hypotheses are assumed to be true quite early in evaluation processes, 
it can be suggested that reasoning may be improved if individuals are encouraged to 
consider alternative hypotheses that challenge the initial hypothesis quite early in the 
evaluation process (Nickerson, 1998). The timing of the presentation of a hypothesis 
disconfirmation intervention may influence its success. Tetlock (1985) found that 
accountability (i.e., making jurors justify their verdicts) only reduced judgement 
biases when mock-jurors were informed of the need to justify their responses before 
evaluating case evidence, and not when mock-jurors were informed of their need to 
justify their responses after evaluating the evidence. Thus, changing the mindset of 
jurors prior to exposing them to confession evidence may disrupt the attributional 
biases involved in arriving at an assumption of guilt by encouraging a more critical 
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initial evaluation of the confession evidence. Furthermore, Tetlock’s (1985) results 
suggest that changing the mindset of jurors may be able to prevent judgemental 
biases but not address them retrospectively. 
 However, one issue that needs to be considered in the implementation of a 
hypothesis disconfirmation, is the potential for a ‘backfire effect’ (Nyhan & Reifler, 
2010). Examining alternate explanations may work to strengthen the initial 
hypothesis, especially if participants struggle to generate a specific number of 
alternate explanations (Robinson & Johnson, 1996).  
This Study 
 Most of the research surrounding false confessions has focused on why 
innocent suspects falsely confess and the extent to which jury-eligible samples are 
able distinguish between true and false confession evidence. However, there is 
currently no research on implementing an intervention that could challenge juror 
perceptions of confession evidence through targeting the cognitive biases that lead to 
an automatic initial hypothesis of guilt. The following research therefore sought to 
overcome this gap in the literature by evaluating the efficacy of a hypothesis 
disconfirmation intervention. More specifically, this study has two main aims. First, 
to examine the extent to which mock-jurors are sensitive to inconsistencies in 
confession evidence, and second, to test a simple hypothesis disconfirmation 
exercise intended to reframe the mindset of jurors and attenuate the judgemental 
biases that can lead from a confession to an automatic assumption of guilt when 
jurors fail to appropriately critique confession evidence (i.e., to potentially increase 
juror sensitivity to indices of confidence strength).  
Despite a number of previous studies finding that jurors overlook 
consistencies in confession evidence (Malloy & Lamb, 2010; Najdowski et al., 2009; 
20 
 
Redlich et al., 2008), as far as it is known, this is only the second study to examine 
juror sensitivity to confession strength by manipulating consistency. Palmer and 
colleagues (2014) found that mock-jurors are sensitive to inconsistencies in 
confession evidence, but only to the extent that the inconsistencies are detected. In 
an attempt to replicate these findings, we selected the presence of inconsistencies as 
our manipulation of confession strength. We included both a strong (consistent) and 
a weak (inconsistent) confession condition to determine if perceptions of evidence 
strength and defendant guilt vary according to the presence of inconsistencies 
between a confession and verifiable case facts outlined in a police report. We 
expected that mock-jurors in strong confession conditions would perceive the 
confession evidence as being stronger than those in weak confession conditions, and 
thus vote ‘guilty’ more often. 
If jurors are prone to over-believe confession evidence, ideally a hypothesis 
disconfirmation intervention would enhance mock-juror sensitivity to 
inconsistencies in confession evidence, reducing the perceived strength of 
confession evidence for weak but not strong confessions. This would also be 
reflected in fewer guilty verdicts in weak compared to strong confession conditions.  
In line with Tetlock’s (1985) research, we expected that the timing of the hypothesis 
disconfirmation intervention would influence its efficacy. Therefore, we presented 
the intervention to different groups at different stages during the process of 
confession evaluation:  prior to evaluating the confession evidence, after evaluating 
the confession evidence or not at all (i.e., a control condition). If judgemental biases 
can be prevented but not reversed as Tetlock (1985) suggested, we would expect to 
see a reduction in the perceived strength of confession evidence in the pre-
confession disconfirmation condition, but not in the post-confession or control 
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conditions. Ideally, the presentation of the hypothesis disconfirmation will not 
simply make mock-jurors more sceptical of confession evidence as increased 
scepticism would reduce the utility of such an intervention. If the intervention did 
make mock-jurors more sceptical, we would expect to see a general decrease in the 
perceived strength of confession evidence.   
 The current study also included a measure of need for cognition (NFC) as an 
exploratory variable. NFC refers to an individual’s intrinsic motivation to engage in 
effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). As jurors attend to and 
evaluate trial-relevant information in order to arrive at a verdict, it is possible that 
individual differences in NFC may influence their styles of information processing 
and decision making (Sommers & Kassin, 2001). Thus, we measured NFC in this 
study to explore the degree to which mock-jurors are differentially influenced by 
confession evidence as a function of NFC. We made no specific predictions relating 
to interactions between NFC and our intervention, but included it as a potential 
individual difference variable.  
Method  
Participants and Design 
 173 participants began the study but 24 were removed due to incomplete data. 
The final study involved 149 participants (117 female), with participants randomly 
assigned relatively equally across the six experimental conditions in a 2 (confession 
strength: weak, strong) x 3 (disconfirmation: pre, post, control) between-subjects 
design.  First year psychology undergraduates from the University of Tasmania 
(n=110) were rewarded with research credit for their participation, while other 
participants entered the draw to win a $50 voucher. Ages ranged from 18-67 
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(M=26.89, SD=11.51) with 18 being the minimum due to the legal minimum age 
requirement for participating as a member of a jury in Australia.  
Materials 
 The study was presented in an online survey format using LimeSurvey. A one 
page mock police report (Appendix A) outlined the verifiable facts of a break-and-
enter burglary and the police procedures that were followed, including obtaining 
statements from the homeowners; scanning the crime scene for evidence; results 
from forensic analyses; the interviewing of suspects; and obtaining a confession 
from the defendant. 
 Two versions of a typed confession (signed by the defendant) were used in the 
study (Appendix B), varying in degrees of strength. The strong confession contained 
details consistent with the details outlined in the police report, while the weak 
confession included a number of details inconsistent with the police report. Both 
versions of the confession were similar in regards to who, what, when, where and 
how the crime was committed, with minor variations in how the house was entered, 
the exact time of day, and the items that were stolen from the house in the weak 
confession. 
 The hypothesis disconfirmation intervention (Appendix C) explained that 
sometimes people confess to crimes that they did not commit. The intervention then 
asked participants to think about and describe the single most plausible reason they 
could imagine as to why someone might falsely confess before rating how plausible 
they thought this explanation was on a 5-point scale (1=not at all plausible, 
5=extremely plausible). The second part of the hypothesis disconfirmation 
intervention asked participants to list up to nine other potential reasons why 
someone might confess to a crime that they did not commit, and rate each reason for 
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plausibility. While the first stage of the intervention was made to be compulsory, the 
second stage was left as optional so as to avoid the risk of backfire effects if 
participants are unable to generate a specific number of explanations.  
 A questionnaire (Appendix 4) asked participants whether they would give the 
defendant a guilty or not guilty verdict, their confidence in the verdict they had just 
given (0=0% to 10=100%), how likely they think it is that the defendant actually 
committed the crime regardless of the verdict they had just given (0=0% to 
10=100%), and how consistent the confession was with the case facts (1=extremely 
inconsistent to 10=extremely consistent). The questionnaire also asked for 
demographic information such as age, sex and whether or not the participant had 
ever been called for jury duty.  
 Cacioppo, Petty and Kao’s (1984) Need for Cognition Scale (NCS) assessed 
differences in motivation to engage in cognitively complex tasks. The scale required 
participants to rate on a 9-point scales (1=very strong disagreement to 9=very strong 
agreement) the degree to which the 18 items best described themselves. Half the 
items of the NCS were reverse scored to prevent response bias from influencing 
ratings. Participant ratings were scored from -4 to 4 and summated. Total scores 
above 0 represented a high need for cognition and scores below 0 reflected a low 
need for cognition. The NCS included items such as ‘I would rather do something 
that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking 
abilities’, ‘I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to 
problems’ and ‘I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that 
requires a lot of effort’.  
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Procedure 
 Participants accessed the online survey and completed the study individually. 
Participants in the control condition read the case description outlined in the police 
report before reading either the weak or strong confession statement and continuing 
to complete the questionnaire and NCS. Participants in the pre-confession 
hypothesis disconfirmation condition were asked to read the police report before 
completing the hypothesis disconfirmation intervention, reading either the strong or 
weak confession statement and following on to complete the questionnaire and NCS. 
Participants in the post-confession hypothesis disconfirmation condition read the 
police report, and either the strong or weak confession before completing the 
hypothesis disconfirmation intervention and completing the questionnaire and NCS. 
Results 
Data Screening and Manipulation Check 
 To check that our confession strength manipulation was effective we analysed 
differences between weak and strong confession groups in their perceptions of the 
consistency between the police report and confession evidence. An independent 
samples t-test revealed that the mean consistency rating (as seen in Table 1) for 
participants in weak confession conditions was significantly lower than for 
participants in strong confession conditions, which was a moderate to large effect, 
t(147) =-3.74, p<.001, f=0.31. As frequentist approaches to null hypothesis 
significance testing consider only the extremeness of data under the null hypothesis, 
with no consideration of evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis, we also 
conducted a Bayesian analysis of the data. Bayesian analysis shows that this effect 
was approximately 90 times more likely to occur if a real effect existed compared to 
the null hypothesis (BF10=90.90). Thus, our manipulation was successful. 
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Disconfirming reasons given by mock-jurors in hypothesis disconfirmation 
conditions were scored for plausibility. Responses were considered plausible so long 
as they provided a logical explanation as to why someone might confess to a crime 
that they did not commit. All participants provided plausible answers, so data 
analyses were based on the full sample. Data was screened to make sure that the 
assumptions for all analyses were met. All assumptions were met, so no corrections 
were necessary. On the basis that NFC might relate to the effectiveness of our 
manipulation, we checked for differences in NFC between conditions (see Table 2). 
There were no significant differences in NFC between strength conditions, F(1, 
138)=.409, p =.524, f=.05, or between hypothesis disconfirmation conditions, F(2, 
138)=.716, p=.491, f=.10, thus we did not consider NFC scores any further. We also 
found no correlation between the number of explanations generated by participants 
in hypothesis disconfirmation conditions (N=96) and confidence in verdict, r=.056, 
p=.587.  
Verdict 
 A three-way hierarchical loglinear analysis assessed the association between 
confession strength, presentation of hypothesis disconfirmation intervention and 
verdict. Hierarchical loglinear analysis is an extension of the chi-square test, used to 
analyse the relationships between two or more categorical variables. A linear model 
is fit to the data that predicts the number of expected cases in a given category. 
Essentially, it is an ANOVA for categorical data (Field, 2013). The final model 
retained only the 2 (strength) x 2 (verdict) association, χ2(8, N=142) =8.432, p=.004, 
indicating that the verdict was influenced by the strength (consistency) of the 
confession evidence, but not by the hypothesis disconfirmation intervention or 
interaction between confession strength and hypothesis disconfirmation. 
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Table 1 
Mean Rating of Perceived Consistency for each Experimental Condition 
 
Note. CI = confidence interval. 
 
Cross tabulation analyses showed that 65% 95%CI [54,76] of participants in strong 
confession conditions provided a guilty verdict compared to only 40% [29,52] of 
participants in strong confession conditions. Thus, the odds of a guilty verdict were 
2.73 [1.41,5.31] times higher in the strong (cf. weak) confession conditions. 
Bayesian analysis found that the main effect of strength was 26 times more likely to 
occur if a real effect existed compared to the null hypothesis (BF10=26.35), and the 
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effect of hypothesis disconfirmation obtained with the given data was twice as likely 
if the null was true, compared to a true effect (BF01=1.98). 
Verdict Preference 
The verdict preference of participants was assessed using two variables: a 
dichotomous verdict decision (guilty, not guilty) and a 10-point confidence-in-
verdict scale (0=0% confidence, 10=100% confidence).  
 
Table 2 
Mean Need for Cognition Score for each Experimental Condition 
 
Note. CI= confidence interval. 
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This process created a new 22-point verdict-preference scale, with -10.5 reflecting 
complete confidence in a not guilty verdict and 10.5 reflecting complete confidence 
in a guilty verdict (Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman & Hastie, 2007). The verdict 
preference scale has been used frequently in mock jury research (e.g., Kassin & 
Wrightsman, 1979; Kerr, Bull, MacCoun, & Rathborn, 1985). It is a more sensitive 
measure than the dichotomous verdict and can be analysed using standard 
parametric tests.  A 2(strength) x 3(hypothesis disconfirmation) between-subjects 
ANOVA assessed the effects of confession strength and hypothesis disconfirmation 
presentation on verdict preference. Consistent with the verdict measure, there was a 
moderate main effect of confession strength on verdict preference, F (1,143) =7.67, 
p=.006, f=0.23, Consistent with the verdict measure, there was a moderate main 
 
Table 3 
Proportion of Participants Giving Guilty Verdicts 
 
Note. CI = confidence interval. 
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effect of confession strength on verdict preference, F (1,143) =7.67, p=.006, f=0.23, 
with the mean verdict preference of weak confession conditions, as listed in Table 4, 
reflecting fewer guilty verdicts than strong confessions conditions. A Bayesian 
ANOVA revealed that these results were 9 times more likely to occur if a real effect 
was to exist than if the null were true (BF10=8.73). There was no significant main 
effect of hypothesis disconfirmation, F (2,143) =1.29, p=.279, f=0.13, or strength x 
hypothesis disconfirmation interaction, F (2,143) =.298, p=.743, f=.06.  Bayes 
analysis shows that the effect of hypothesis disconfirmation is 3 times more likely 
under the null (BF10=0.269), while the interaction was twice as likely if a real effect 
was to exist (BF10=1.173), however this is likely a remnant of the strength effect. 
These results support the idea that mock-jurors are sensitive to inconsistencies in 
confession evidence, yet there is no evidence that the hypothesis disconfirmation 
intervention affected decision-making. 
Perceived Likelihood of Guilt 
 A 2(strength) x 3(hypothesis disconfirmation) between-subjects ANOVA was 
conducted to assess the effect of presentation of hypothesis disconfirmation and 
confession strength on perceived likelihood of guilt. While not significant, the main 
effect of strength on perceived likelihood of guilt bordered on significance and the 
effect size exceeded the cut-off for a small effect, F (1,143) =3.80, p=.053, f=.16. 
There is some evidence to suggest that, consistent with the verdict and verdict 
preference measures, the strong confession condition produced higher perceptions of 
likelihood of guilt than the weak confession conditions (please refer to Table 5 for 
descriptive statistics). The main effect of hypothesis disconfirmation on perceived 
likelihood of guilt was non-significant, F (2,143) =.67, p=.512, f=.10, as was the 
interaction between confession strength and hypothesis disconfirmation, F (2,143) 
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=1.63, p=.200, f=.15. A 2(strength) x 3(hypothesis disconfirmation) between-
subjects Bayesian ANOVA, revealed that the strength effect obtained is 1.3 
(BF10=1.3) times more likely if a real effect exists, while the hypothesis 
disconfirmation effect and strength x hypothesis disconfirmation interaction were 7 
(BF10=.14) and 5 (BF10=0.19) times more likely under the null hypothesis 
respectively. Consistent with verdict preference, there evidence to support the idea 
that jurors are aware of inconsistencies in the confession evidence, but again no 
evidence to support any effect of hypothesis disconfirmation.  
 
Table 4 
Mean Verdict Preference for Each Experimental Condition 
 
Note. CI = confidence interval 
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Table 5 
Mean Ratings of Perceived Likelihood of Guilt for Each Experimental Condition 
 
Note. CI = confidence interval.  
Discussion 
 This research had two aims. First, we examined the extent to which mock-
jurors were sensitive to inconsistencies in confession evidence. The results 
supported our first hypothesis regarding a main effect of strength, with mock-jurors 
in weak confession conditions rating the confession evidence as weaker (i.e., less 
consistent) and giving significantly fewer guilty verdicts that mock-jurors in strong 
confession conditions. These results contradict a mixture of anecdotal and empirical 
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evidence that has previously suggested that mock-jurors overlook inconsistencies in 
confession evidence (Malloy & Lamb, 2010; Najdowski et al., 2009; Redlich et al., 
2008). 2009). Our results do, however, support Palmer et al.’s (2014) findings, 
demonstrating that, at least in some contexts, mock-jurors are sensitive to 
inconsistent confession evidence, and can adjust their perceptions of defendant 
culpability accordingly. Therefore, despite jurors’ tendency to over-believe 
questionable confessions (i.e., those obtained under coercive conditions; Henkel et 
al., 2008; Kassin & Sukel, 1997), our results indicate that jurors are not entirely 
insensitive to factors related to confession strength. 
 Our second aim was to test if a hypothesis disconfirmation intervention was 
capable of encouraging greater critical evaluation of confession evidence by mock-
jurors, thus enhancing their sensitivity to any inconsistencies. The results did not 
support the hypothesised benefits of hypothesis disconfirmation, with the 
intervention having no effect on any of the dependent variables. We found no main 
effects of hypothesis disconfirmation, and more importantly, no interaction between 
hypothesis disconfirmation and confession strength (i.e., no evidence that hypothesis 
disconfirmation enhanced sensitivity to confession strength). This was surprising 
due to the efficacy of hypothesis disconfirmation in a range of other domains, 
including the combatting of overconfidence in eyewitness identifications (Brewer et 
al., 2002). Before considering reasons why the intervention did not have an effect in 
this instance, we will first revisit the theory behind our reasoning for conducting this 
study. 
Jurors have a tendency to over-believe confession evidence thanks to an 
array of cognitive biases. Based on the literature we speculated that first, in order to 
comprehend a confession, the juror must accept it to some degree (Spinoza, 
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1677/1982). Thus, in order to comprehend the evidence, the juror forms an initial 
hypothesis suggesting that the confession is truthful. Second, people expect others to 
behave in a self-serving manner, and therefore find it difficult to comprehend why a 
defendant might falsely confess, especially given that the consequences of doing so 
are obvious (Kassin, 2005). Third, the FAE reflects a human tendency to interpret 
the behaviour of others at face value, attributing it to the disposition of the actor 
while failing to consider the situational factors that may have influenced the actor’s 
behaviour (Ross, 1977). This suggests that jurors will largely be blind to situational 
forces such as the coercive tactics used by investigators in the elicitation of the 
confession statement. The combination of these three factors is likely to lead a juror 
to assume that the defendant is guilty quite early within a trial (Devine & Ostrom, 
1985). Research on confirmation bias demonstrates that once people form an 
impression, it is often hard to overcome, even when strong evidence suggests that 
the initial impression was wrong (Nickerson, 1998; Ross, 1977). Jurors are likely to 
overlook, discount or assimilate new information that is not congruent with their 
initial impressions of guilt, and all subsequent evidence is likely to be evaluated in 
light of this initial hypothesis (Nickerson, 1998). Once jurors have decided that a 
confession is equated with guilt, this impression is likely to shape their 
interpretations of all subsequent evidence (Costanzo et al., 2010). Furthermore, once 
confession evidence is presented and an impression of guilt is formed, jurors are not 
likely to readjust their impressions of guilt when subsequent evidence is shown 
(Kalven & Zeisel, 1971; Lawson, 1968). This process is particularly problematic for 
innocent defendants who have falsely confessed, and so we have tried to implement 
an intervention to challenge the cognitive biases of jurors by forcing them to 
consider alternate explanations for confessing using hypothesis disconfirmation 
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techniques. We thought that when presented before reading a confession statement, 
the hypothesis disconfirmation intervention might work by interrupting automatic 
acceptance, self-serving expectations and FAE, allowing the juror to more critically 
evaluate the confession and not fixate on an initial hypothesis of guilt. By presenting 
the intervention after the confession evidence, while this initial assumption of guilt 
might have already been formed, confirmation bias may have been prevented, 
allowing jurors to readjust their initial hypotheses of guilt. However, we found no 
evidence to suggest that the intervention had any effect on mock-juror perceptions of 
confession evidence.    
There are six potential reasons why the hypothesis disconfirmation 
intervention may not have had an effect in the current study, despite its demonstrated 
efficacy in other domains. First, the materials in this study may have been too 
simplistic, making the strength manipulation too obvious. The task may have been 
too easy, meaning that participants did not need to think critically to evaluate the 
confession evidence and thus did not require the help of the intervention. Second, 
the vast majority of the participants (113 out of 144) in this study scored relatively 
high on NFC (i.e., above the midpoint of the scale). Thus, these people may have 
been pre-disposed to evaluate the evidence more thoroughly. However, NFC 
appeared to have no influence on perceptions of confession evidence, with no 
differences found between high and low NFC participants on any of the dependent 
variables (admittedly, given the imbalance between NFC groups, this must be 
interpreted with caution).  
Third, if participants detected inconsistencies in the confession evidence, 
they may have been prompted to self-generate alternative explanations for the 
confession (see Palmer et al., 2014). This spontaneous generation of alternate 
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explanations may have resulted in fewer guilty verdicts being rendered by mock-
jurors in weak confession groups. If this was the case, explicitly instructing 
participants to generate alternate explanations, as is the nature of hypothesis 
disconfirmation, would be redundant. This possibility is in line with Palmer and 
colleagues’ (2014) proposal that when no alternative explanation for confessing 
(other than being guilty) was made salient to mock-jurors, inconsistencies may have 
prompted them to spontaneously generate their own alternate explanations. The 
extent to which mock-jurors are able to generate alternate explanations may 
influence the extent to which inconsistencies undermine the credibility of the 
confession evidence. Participants who struggle to generate explanations may 
experience a backfire effect, with the hypothesis disconfirmation strengthening their 
initial hypothesis regarding guilt. However, our study found no significant 
correlation between the number of alternative explanations and confidence in the 
verdict given, so this effect could be trivial at best.   
Fourth, this study solely looked at inconsistencies between the information 
within the confession statement and the case facts outlined in the police report. 
However, the effects of inconsistencies on juror judgements may vary for different 
types of inconsistencies (Najdowski et al., 2009). For example, previous studies 
have shown that contradictions within a witness statement in court undermine 
credibility more so than providing new information in court that was absent from 
previous statements (Berman & Cutler, 1996). This means that the capacity of a 
hypothesis disconfirmation intervention to enhance the critical evaluation of 
confession evidence by jurors may vary as a function of the type of inconsistencies 
present. In the absence of other guidelines, we selected a manipulation akin to 
Palmer and colleagues (2014), but perhaps it would have been useful to see if the 
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hypothesis disconfirmation intervention could alert jurors to potentially less obvious 
sources of inconsistencies. Fifth, we must entertain the possibility that the 
hypothesis disconfirmation may simply be an ineffective intervention in this context. 
Sixth, given the FAE, hypothesis disconfirmation might be more effective in cases 
where the confession is tainted by coercion (i.e., it might prompt jurors to consider 
these environmental factors more carefully). 
It is possible that an intervention like the hypothesis disconfirmation 
technique used in the current study might simply encourage jurors to be more 
sceptical of confession evidence (i.e., reducing the perceptions of strength and 
likelihood of guilt for both strong and weak confession evidence). However, the 
absence of a main effect suggests that the hypothesis disconfirmation intervention 
did not have this effect on mock-jurors. Thus, although we did not find the 
anticipated effect on sensitivity, we also did not find any evidence of an effect on 
scepticism – which is a positive.  
Limitations and Future Research  
As mentioned earlier in the discussion, the current experimental materials 
were quite simplistic, which may have undermined the hypothesis disconfirmation 
intervention by making the task too easy. Inconsistencies in the weak confession 
may have been so obvious that participants did not need to critically evaluate the 
confession in order to detect them, creating substantial doubt around the confessor’s 
culpability. This doubt could have limited the capacity of the hypothesis 
disconfirmation to have any effect in increasing critical evaluation of the confession 
evidence. A more complex or ambiguous case may produce different results. We 
plan to replicate this experiment with more complex/ambiguous materials to see if 
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the simplicity of the current materials did reduce the efficacy of the hypothesis 
disconfirmation. 
 The external validity of the experiment may be limited by its mock-jury 
format and predominantly undergraduate sample. While mock jury studies are high 
in internal validity (Kapardis, 2014), concerns have been raised about the 
generalisability of such studies (Bornstein, 1999). For example, outcomes might 
differ based on characteristics such as mock-juror samples (e.g., undergraduates vs. 
community dwelling adults), research settings (e.g., laboratory vs. courtroom), trial 
medium (e.g., written summaries vs. more realistic simulations), trial elements 
included (e.g., the presence or absence of deliberation), dependent variables included 
(e.g., dichotomous verdict decision vs. continuous probability of guilt judgements), 
and consequences of the task (e.g., a hypothetical decision vs. a decision with real 
outcomes) (Bornstein, 1999). Empirical studies have found that undergraduate 
participants do not always generalise to the population as a whole (Sears, 1986), and 
the infrequency of undergraduates participating in actual juries may be problematic 
(Bray & Kerr, 1982). As 74% of the current sample were undergraduate students, it 
is possible that they have a greater capacity for critical thinking than the general 
population. Further, as most were Psychology students, it is possible that knowledge 
of cognitive biases and heuristics, and critical thinking, may have reduced their 
susceptibility to engage in such biases. However, Bornstein’s (1999) meta-analytic 
results show that only five of 26 studies found a significant main effect of sample 
type, with students typically being more lenient in their verdicts than other sample 
types.  Similarly, very few differences emerged between other variables of concern 
in mock jury studies. Thus, despite the intuitively plausible concerns with using 
student samples and simplistic materials, Bornstein’s (1999) work suggests that the 
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results obtained from these designs may be generalisable. However, they should also 
be interpreted with caution. Diamond (1997) suggested a two stage model for 
conducting mock jury studies. Stage one should be simple research using simple 
written materials and student samples, while stage two should use more 
representative methods such as recordings of real trials and real juror samples. While 
acknowledging the absence of an effect in the current study, if future studies were to 
determine that hypothesis disconfirmation could be effective in influencing juror 
perceptions of confession evidence, it might be useful to follow-up with more 
representative samples, and see if this affects the deliberation process. Furthermore, 
a more complex method involving the presentation of multiple pieces of evidence 
may allow inferences to be made regarding the efficacy of the hypothesis 
disconfirmation intervention to disrupt confirmation bias in the evaluation of 
subsequent evidence. 
 The simplicity of the research method may also have influenced the efficacy 
of the hypothesis disconfirmation intervention. In a real trial, confession evidence 
would not be presented in isolation. Presenting only confession evidence may have a 
number of effects. First, the absence of more ambiguous and/or exculpatory 
evidence might make it easier for participants to evaluate confession evidence, thus 
increasing their sensitivity to inconsistencies. Second, it may reduce the interplay 
between evidence types. Given the demonstrated capacity for confession evidence to 
affect juror perceptions of other evidence (Dror & Charlton, 2006; Elaad et al., 1994; 
Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Kukucka & Kassin, 2013), the simplicity of the evidence in 
the current study means that the verdict decision obtained might not reflect the 
verdict reached if all evidence were presented. In other words, the presence of a 
confession increases the perceived strength of other evidence, thus increasing guilty 
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verdicts. Third, it reduces the complexity of the case, and possibly the allure of a 
confession (i.e., as the most clear-cut index of guilt in an ambiguous decision-
making task).   
 Future research could also implement a repeated-measures design. This could 
test initial hypotheses of guilt against final verdict decisions, determining if the 
intervention is capable of changing perceptions of guilt at an individual level. It 
would also be interesting to see if hypothesis disconfirmation might prevent people 
from bowing to situational pressure within group deliberations. It might work to 
make mock-jurors more open to the opinions of other jurors since they have already 
considered alternate explanations, and thus allow them to readjust their initial 
hypotheses regarding culpability.  
Implications  
Currently, there are no known interventions directly targeting jurors’ 
cognitive biases in an effort to prevent them from influencing evaluations of 
confession evidence. Kassin (2008) recognised that we need to improve the way in 
which judges and juries evaluate confession evidence, and suggested two ways in 
which this could be done. First, interrogations should be videotaped, with full 
recordings made available to judges and juries to provide context as to how the 
confession was produced. Theoretically, this should alert triers of fact to procedural 
impropriety, and allow them to adjust their perceptions of the confession 
appropriately. However, research by Lassiter and Geers (2004) shows that 
videorecording interrogations is not that simple, and camera perspective bias 
influences juror perceptions of the interrogation, and, perhaps more importantly, 
research shows that even when jurors perceive a confession as less voluntary and 
claim that the confession did not influence their decision-making, it still does 
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(Kassin & Sukel, 1997). This is why we need to change the way jurors perceive 
confession evidence by directly targeting underlying cognitive processes. Second, 
expert witnesses could help to highlight areas of concern surrounding the production 
of a confession and the contents of the confession itself. Expert witness testimony is 
likely to be introduced in a trial by the defence, after the confession evidence has 
already been presented. This means that jurors have already evaluated any 
confession evidence, and already arrived at their initial hypothesis as to whether or 
not the defendant is guilty (Nickerson, 1998). It is unlikely that jurors are going to 
search their memories and re-evaluate all of the previously presented evidence in 
light of any new information introduced by the expert witness, and thus the initial 
hypothesis is likely to remain (Ross & Anderson, 1982). An intervention early in the 
evaluation process could be beneficial for targeting juror perceptions before that 
initial hypothesis is formed.  
 While this study found no effects of hypothesis disconfirmation on mock-
jurors’ perceptions of evidence strength and defendant culpability, this was in a 
situation where mock-jurors were apparently already sensitive to confession 
strength. Before hypothesis disconfirmation is labelled as an ineffective technique 
for encouraging jurors to more critically evaluate confession evidence, its efficacy 
should first be tested in cases where jurors’ over-belief in confession evidence is 
more pronounced. 
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Appendix E 
Juror Perceptions of Confession Evidence 
Participant Information Sheet 
Invitation 
We would like to invite you to participate in the study named above. 
This study is being conducted in partial fulfillment of an Honours degree for Kelly 
Porter under the supervision of Dr Jim Sauer. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
This study examines how jurors evaluate evidence and factors that influence 
perceptions of evidence strength. 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate in this study due to your enrolment in 
undergraduate Psychology units at the University of Tasmania. 
While we would greatly appreciate your participation in this study we do recognise 
and respect your right not to take part. Please note that you will not be penalised in 
any way if you choose not to participate in this study, and your relationship with the 
University of Tasmania will not be affected. 
This Participation Information Sheet will explain what is involved with participating 
in this research task. Knowing what is involved will help you to decide whether or 
not you would like to participate in this study, so please read this information 
carefully. 
What will I be asked to do? 
If you consent to participating in this research study you will be asked to read a page 
of case facts related to a non-violent crime. You will then be asked to read a 
confession statement, signed by the defendant in question. You will then be asked a 
series of questions about the materials you have read and the strength of the 
evidence against the defendant. 
This task is expected to take approximately 15 minutes in total to complete. 
Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
While there may be no direct benefits of this research study to you as a participant, 
this study does have potential benefits for the wider community. Understanding how 
potential jurors evaluate evidence can help to develop methods for presenting 
evidence within a trial that maximise the quality of juror decision making. 
Participants who are enrolled in first year psychology units will have the option to 
redeem research participation credit from this study. 
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If you are not a first year psychology student, or wish not to redeem research 
participation credit, you will be eligible to go in the draw to win a $50 gift voucher 
to one of the following places: BWS or Coles Myer. 
If you would like to enter the draw to win this gift voucher you will just need to tell 
us your email address at the completion of the survey. Please note that your email 
address will be stored in a separate data base to your survey questions, and your 
answers will not be identifiable in any way by providing this information. 
Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
We do not believe that there are any foreseeable risks associated with participating 
in this study. 
What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
Please be aware that if you choose to participate in this study, you are free to 
withdraw at any time before submitting the survey. There will be no penalties, and 
you can withdraw without providing us with an explanation. If you choose to 
withdraw prior to submitting to your survey all information you have provided up 
until that will be destroyed. Please note that once you have submitted your survey it 
may not be possible to remove your data due to the anonymous nature of responses. 
What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
All data related to participation in this study will be stored securely in the 
Psychology department on the Sandy Bay campus of the University of Tasmania. 
All paper-based surveys will be stored within a locked filing cabinet within a locked 
office. All electronic files will be stored securely on a password-protected hard 
drive. 
It is recommended that all research data is kept for a minimum of 5 years from the 
date of first publication. After this time paper-based surveys will be shredded, while 
online surveys will be erased from the hard drive. 
With your permission, we may choose to archive the data from this study for use in 
future research studies. If you are happy for us to archive your data, please let us 
know on the consent form. 
Please note that all data retained will remain confidential and anonymous. 
How will the results of the study be published? 
The results of this study will be disseminated in my Honours thesis. The results of 
this study should be finalised by the end of September 2016. If you would like 
access to a summary of results please contact either myself (Kelly) at 
kporter0@utas.edu.au or Dr Jim Sauer at Jim.Sauer@utas.edu.au and we will make 
this available to you as soon as possible. 
Please note that all participants will be unidentifiable in the publication of results. 
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What if I have questions about this study? 
If you have any questions about this study, or would like to report any potential risks 
that may have been overseen during the design phase, please do not hesitate to 
contact us. 
Dr Jim Sauer 
Email: Jim.Sauer@utas.edu.au 
Phone: 6226 2051 
Kelly Porter 
Email: kporter0@utas.edu.au 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this 
study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on 
+61 3 6226 6254 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the 
person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote 
ethics reference number H12662. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to consider participating in this study. 
Please note that by continuing with the survey you are consenting to having your 
responses included in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Appendix F 
Ethics Approval 
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Appendix G 
Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Confession Consistency 
 
T-test for Confession Strength and Perceived Confession Consistency 
 
2 (Strength) x 3 (Hypothesis Disconfirmation) Bayesian ANOVA for Perceived 
Confession Consistency 
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Hierarchical Loglinear Analysis: Strength x Hypothesis Disconfirmation x Verdict 
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2 (Strength) x 3 (Hypothesis disconfirmation) ANOVA on Verdict Preference
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2 (Strength) x (3 (Hypothesis Disconfirmation) Bayesian ANOVA of Verdict 
Preference 
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2 (Strength) x 3 (Hypothesis Disconfirmation) ANOVA on Perceived Likelihood 
of Guilt 
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2 (Strength) x 3 (Hypothesis Disconfirmation) Bayesian ANOVA on Perceived 
Likelihood of Guilt 
 
 
 
70 
 
2 (Strength) x 3 (Hypothesis Disconfirmation) ANOVA on NFC 
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